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In this paper we examine the role played by technology spillovers between the United States
and the Euro area. We explicitly assume that the United States acts as a growth leader for
Europe and that the Euro area is constantly converging to US total factor productivity (TFP)
levels. As a result, a growing divergence in the level of US TFP vis-` a-vis that of Europe
results in an increase in the growth rate of Euro area TFP. The model is applied to TFP data
from 26 subsectors of both economies. The role of greater ICT adoption in increasing Euro
area TFP is also explored.Non Technical Summary
The relationship between Europe and the United States has become an area of increasing inter-
est. In particular many studies have focused on labour market and business cycle developments.
This paper differs in that we explicitly examine the long-run relationship between both areas by
examining the possibility of technology spillovers. In particular, we assess whether there is a rela-
tionship between the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in different industry sub-sector
categories in the US and their counterparts in Europe. In our modelling framework we assume that
the United States acts a growth leader for the Euro area. This methodology implies that the greater
the difference in levels between TFP in the United States and Europe, the greater the growth rate
of European TFP. Given the possibility of heterogeneity across the different sectors of the econ-
omy we estimate a ﬁxed effects regression model which yields plausible and signiﬁcant results.
We modify our model to address the role played by ICT in increasing European TFP growth both
directly and indirectly. Our results indicate that ICT has a positive impact on productivity growth
in Europe. We also ﬁnd that increased use of ICT increases the convergence of EU TFP levels
to US TFP levels. The data suggests that over the sample a change took place in the respective
performances of both economies, therefore we examine and detect for the possibility of structural
breaks. Weconductaseriesofrecursiveestimationinordertoanalysehowtherateofconvergence
between the Euro area and the United States has changed over time as a result.1
1. Introduction
From the outset, the economic performance of the Euro area has frequently been compared with
that of the United States. Living standards in Europe had, for most of the post-war era, been
converging to those of the United States due mainly to the relative improvement in European
labour productivity. And, while, of late, this convergence process has been somewhat diminished,
many studies of European economic performance center on the performance of the Euro area vis-
` a-vis that of the United States. Studies such as Blanchard (2004), Gordon (2004), Dew-Becker
and Gordon (2006), van Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer (2008) and McQuinn and Whelan (2008)
compare, across both regions, the relative performance of key economic concepts, particularly,
those in the labour market.
A related, emerging, literature has begun to examine the possibililty of a more, formal, rela-
tionship between the Euro area and the United States - business cycle developments in the Euro
area are explicity related to movements in the United States ( D´ ees, di Mauro, Pesaran and Smith
(2007), Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) and D´ ees and Saint-Guilhem (2009) being notable
examples). Implicit in such an approach is the notion of the United States being a growth leader
with economic regions such as the Euro area constantly converging to higher levels of US income,
primarily through learning and adopting technologies originally advanced in the US economy.
Our paper contributes to this recent literature by explicitly examining technology spillovers
between the United States and the Euro area. In particular, we address whether there are spillovers
between the rate of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in different industry subsector cater-
gories in the US and their counterparts in the Euro Area. Using a relatively straightforward model
of technology transfer, we assume that TFP growth across the different sectors of the Euro area
economy is mainly a function of the difference in TFP levels between the United States and the
Euro area. If this gap increases i.e. US TFP levels become greater than those in the Euro area,
than the growth rate of TFP in the Euro area increases.
While most of the studies formally examining the relationship between the US and the Euro
area have focussed on the linkages between output or output per capita levels, our focus on TFP
as the main growth channel between the two regions is motivated, to a large extent, by the recent
reknewed emphasis on the underlying assumptions of the original Solow growth model - (see,
for example, the special edition of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy Vol. 23, Number 1,
2007). As noted in McQuinn and Whelan (2007a) and (2007b), the Solow model speciﬁes that,
in the long run, the growth rate of the steady-state path of an economy is determined only by
technological efﬁciency. Therefore, if some long-run economic relationship exists between the
United States and the Euro area, underpinning this must be some relationship between the rates of2
TFP in both regions.
Using our model, we ﬁnd strong evidence of technology spillovers from the United States
to the Euro area. In particular, an increase in the level of US TFP in different subsectors of the
economy relative to the Euro area results in an increase in the growth rate of European TFP.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd additional evidence to suggest that the greater adoption of ICT technology
in the Euro area increases Euro area TFP in two seperate channels (i) by increasing TFP directly
and (ii) by increasing the ability of the Euro area to learn from and converge to US TFP levels.
Over the sample period in question, there is strong evidence to suggest signiﬁcant changes in the
relative patterns of Euro area and US TFP growth. Therefore, we also address the possibility of
stuctural changes in Euro area TFP rates within the modelling framework.
Achieving a greater understanding of the dynamics of Euro area growth is clearly of concern
to a variety of governments and institutions. The European Central Bank’s (ECB) constitution
calls for it to promote economic growth within the Euro area as long as this does not undermine
its primary goal of price stability. As a result the ECB has become a key participant in public
debates about the need for structural reforms to boost the potential capacity for growth in the
Euro area. Discussions of this issue have, for instance, regularly featured in the ofﬁcial statements
accompanying the decisions of the ECB Governing Council and in the public statements of the
ECB President.1 The relatively poor European growth performance of the past 10 years has had
an important inﬂuence on the policy focus of national governments, the European Commission,
and the European Central Bank (ECB). This reform agenda has been formalised in the Lisbon
Agenda set of policy proposals and discussed in high-proﬁle publications such as the 2003 Sapir
Report.
The contents of the rest of the paper are as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the recent
literature examining the economic performance of the Euro area and the United States. Section
3 outlines the model of technology diffusion employed. Section 4 discusses the EU KLEMS
database, while section 5 presents the results of the empirical application. A ﬁnal section offers
some concluding comments.
2. The United States and the Euro Area
“If the United States sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold” ((IMF (2007), World Economic
Outlook). The notion of the United States as the “engine” of the world economy with its business
cycle leading the rest of the world, is reinforced by recent research by D´ ees and Saint-Guilhem
1For example, see Jean-Claude Trichet: Testimony before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the
European Parliament, 23rd May 2005. Available online at: www.bis.org/review/r050530b.pdf.3
(2009). In emphasising the US dominance in terms of its weight within each country’s trade, US
(18%), Euro area (16%), Japan (11%) and UK (8%), D´ ees and Saint-Guilhem raise concern about
the harmful spillover effects of a US recession on other economies. While they maintain that some
economies have decoupled themselves from the current US recession, they ﬁnd that the inﬂuence
of the United States on other economies is larger than direct trade ties would suggest.
Much of the research looking at the United States and Europe has addressed the relation-
ship between trends in both labour and total factor productivity in the different regions. Van Ark,
O’Mahony and Timmer (2008) maintain that Europe experienced a slowdown in labour productiv-
ity from the mid 1990s as a result of the slower emergence of the knowledge economy compared
to the United States. They claim that this represents a long-term pattern of convergence. They
break up the sample into three sub-samples. Between 1950 and 1973 European labour produc-
tivity growth was characterised by strong investment and imitation of foreign technology thus
suggesting a catch-up pattern. This convergence process ended in the mid 1970s when labour pro-
ductivity growth in both Europe and the United States began to slow. During this time Europe’s
labour force participation and hours worked declined. Since 1995, US labour productivity growth
increased while European labour productivity declined. They ﬁnd that investment in information
technology and the share of technology producing industries was lower in Europe. They em-
phasise the need for improved labour productivity growth in European market services to boost
overall growth and narrow the gap with the United States, by creating a“single market” for the
services industry through the adoption of the Services Directive in 2006. These trends in respec-
tive labour productivity rates are also examined in McQuinn and Whelan (2008). Figure 1, which
is reproduced from McQuinn and Whelan (2008)2, shows Euro Area and US labour productivity
growth from 1973 until 2006. It is clear from the graph that until the mid 1990s the growth of
labour productivity in the Euro area always exceeded that in the United States.3
In Figure 2 we present comparisons of capital stock and TFP growth rates for the US and Euro
area.4 The ﬁrst graph in Figure 2 shows that capital input has generally grown faster in the US than
in the Euro area. In particular, the ﬁgure highlights the strong growth in the capital stock during
the mid to late-1990s when the US went through a period of very strong growth in investment. In
a growth accounting framework, one of the implications of the stronger US capital growth is that
the TFP growth record of the Euro area relative to the US has been even stronger than its positive
2Figure 1 p.646.
3This is similar to the ﬁndings of O’Mahony et al (2008). Many authors, including Blanchard (2004), maintain that
the Europe’s superior productivity performance and subsequent slowdown is a result of the catching up process. From
the middle of the 1980s hours worked per capita declined considerably in the Euro area, while US hours worked per
capita increased signiﬁcantly after initially being behind Europe in the 1970s.
4This graph is also reproduced from McQuinn and Whelan (2008) (Figure 4 p. 653).4
labour productivity growth record. Indeed, the second graph in the ﬁgure shows that TFP growth5
in the Euro area exceeded the comparable series for the US over almost every 3-year period from
the early 1970s until 1992. The period since, however, has shown US TFP growth moving ahead.
In particular, the period since 2000 has seen the gap between Euro area and US TFP growth widen,
with the Euro area appearing to have settled down at a very low growth rate of about 0.5 percent
per year.
In terms of empirically examining the relationship between the two regions, a recent study by
Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) represents an important contribution. They analyse output
dynamics in the Euro area and compare differences with the United States. It appears that cycles
in both the Euro area and the United States are driven by a common world shock while the Euro
area appears to lag the US. They examine the gap between real GDP per capita of country i with
respect to the Euro area. The gaps with the US and other countries have been stable over the
last thirty years and they ﬁnd that the gap between the US and Euro area is stationary. It closes
during recessions as Europe reacts slowly to worldwide shocks. The Euro area cycle seems to be
smoother than the US one and recessions are shorter in the euro area. Euro area growth follows US
growth which they test using Granger causality tests. The Euro area adjusts to US growth but the
US does not respond to Euro area shocks. After a worldwide shock the US adjusts immediately
while the Euro area reacts slowly taking 5 years to reach its steady state. They also ﬁnd that the
US economy has a higher ability to absorb technology faster than the euro area.




of technology transfer. The model has been employed in a variety of different applications. For
example, Nelson and Phelps (1966) look at the effect that educated people have on innovation, and
how education can speed the process of technology diffusion, while Bernard and Jones’s (1996)
version of model is based on technology diffusion in the manufacturing sector of the USA. The
version of the model used in this paper is outlined fully in McGuinness (2007) and constitutes a
slightly different version of the model presented in Acemoglu (2008).
In our version of the model, we are interested in the gap in technology growth levels between
5McQuinn and Whelan (2008) generate their estimates of TFP using a similiar method to that employed in EU-
KLEMS.5
different economic areas. The underlying assumption is that there is a lead economic region -
the United States and an economic region which follows - the Euro area. The United States has
technology level, At, which grows at rate g, while the Euro area has technology level Bt, where
Bt < At. The United States technology growth rate is assumed to be exogenous while the Euro
area’s technology growth is endogenous. In continuous time these technology levels grow at a
rate of:
˙ B(t) = λ(A(t) − B(t)). (1)
where (A(t) − B(t)) is the technology or productivity gap between the United States and the Euro
area. The parameter λ measures the portion of the gap that can be closed due to the Euro area’s
convergence speed through absorbing knowledge and new technology from the US. The greater
the gap the more the Euro area has to learn and therefore the greater the degree of convergence
required.
3.2. Solution to the Steady State and Convergence
The steady-state solution of (1) is where technology in both regions grows at the same rate. There-


























In this case, the Euro area always has technology levels, which are less then the United States
and can only experience increases in technology if there is a gap between the level of technology
in the US and Europe. As long as the United States grows at rate g, then Europe can acquire new
technologies from them. Therefore, in the steady state Europe must have lower technology levels6
than the United States.
McGuinness (2007) has derived the general solution for the convergence process to the steady-
state path. By solving equation (1) it can be shown that the steady state equilibrium is relevant if
convergence occurs. It is expressed below with all B(t) terms on the left hand side
˙ B(t) + λB(t) = λA(t) (6)
Given that
˙ A(t)
A(t) = g, its particular solution is A(t) = A(0)egt therefore the differential equation
can be re-written in the form
˙ B(t) + λB(t) = λA(0)egt (7)
One possible solution for a B(t) process that will satisfy this equation is in the form D1egt where
D1 is some unknown coefﬁcient. It must satisfy the following equation
gD1egt + λD1egt = λA(0)egt (8)
Canceling the egt terms, gives






so this is solution corresponds exactly to the steady-state path in which the follower country has










Now note that we have a solution of the form
B(t) = B1(t) + B2(t)
which has the property that
˙ B(t) = ˙ B1(t) + ˙ B2(t) (12)
So, a combined solution of this form will still satisfy equation (6) as long as
˙ B2(t) + λ ˙ B2(t) = 0 (13)7
Which solves as
B2(t) = D2e−λt (14)









A(t) + D2e−λt (16)
Given that e−λt tends toward zero as time goes on, the solution converges to the ﬁrst term, which
is growing at rate g, as required in the steady state.
Therefore, this clearly demonstrates that even if there is TFP growth in the follower country
and this closes some of the gap with the leader country, the follower will never actually catch-up
because λ
g+λ is less then one. The leader will always be growing at rate g, this implies that the
follower will always have technology levels below that of the leader. The model also shows that
it is not the countries’ ability to invent new capital goods that is the key to growth but instead
their ability to absorb and learn technology from advanced countries. Therefore, the higher the
absorption speed of the follower countries, the faster they will converge on the leader.
4. The EU KLEMS Database
The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts database, as described in detail in Timmer,
O’Mahony and Van Ark (2007), is the principal data source for this study. The database is the
product of a research project ﬁnanced by the European Commission and undertaken by a group
of organisations from across the EU in close cooperation with national statistical institutes as well
as the European Commission and the OECD. The EU KLEMS dataset is speciﬁcally designed
for the analysis of growth and productivity developments, at an industry level, across European
countries. The data used in the present study is based upon the March 2007 release of the database.
The variables covered in the EU KLEMS database can be broken down into three main categories,
speciﬁcally, “basic” variables, growth accounting variables and an “additional” variables series.
The ﬁrst of these categories relates to a basic series of variables including output and inter-
mediate inputs, namely, energy, material and service inputs, at current and constant prices, as
well as labour input (employment and hours worked). The “basic” variables dataset was largely
constructed on the basis of the national accounts of individual countries. The data series was har-
monised on a cross-country basis using the NACE industrial classiﬁcation as well as similar price8
concepts for inputs and outputs. This category of variables is available for the original EU-15
countries for the thirty-ﬁve year period from 1970-2004 and from 1995 onwards in respect of the
EU member states joining on 1 May 2004 i.e. EU-10.
The second category of variables, the growth accounting series, includes data on capital ser-
vices, labour services, and total factor productivity. This growth accounting series is based upon
the methodology of Jorgensen and Griliches (1967) together with the more recent input-output
framework of Jorgensen, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) and Jorgensen, Ho and Stiroh (2005).
The measure of total factor productivity (TFP) in EU-KLEMS is based on a standard growth
accounting approach. The growth rate of TFP is deﬁned as the growth rate of output minus the
weighted growth rates of inputs (intermediate inputs (X) , capital (K) and labour (L)), where the
weights (v) denote two-period average shares of the inputs in the nominal value of output (Timmer
et al., 2007). The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that the weights sum to 1. The
contribution of each input to growth is deﬁned as the product of the input’s growth rate and its
two-period average revenue share.




Table 16 shows the percentage contributions of the various NACE sectors to overall employ-
ment and output between 1980 and 2005. The striking feature about this Table is the large sig-
niﬁcant contribution that the construction sector made to both output and employment in the EU
and the US, with the formers contribution being the largest. Retail and wholesale trade also had a
signiﬁcant effect on employment contributing 9.8 per cent and 15.9 per cent to total employment
in the EU and US respectively. Financial Intermediation contributed 7.4 per cent to output in the
US over this period and 5.9 per cent in the EU, the contributions to employment in these sectors
were also very signiﬁcant. The real estate sector made very little contribution to employment but
contributed 8.1 per cent to output in the EU and 9.4 per cent in the US. Renting made a large
contribution to both output and employment in both areas. The contributions of the agricultural
and manufacturing sectors were positive but smaller in magnitude to both output and employment
in the EU and US.
In Table 2 we present annual average sectoral TFP growth rates for both the US and the Euro
area. Over the entire sample, the results highlight negative TFP growth in a number of sectors,
namely mining, renting and hotels in both the EU and US, with negative TFP growth in electricity
and construction in the US only. This suggests productivity deterioration in these sectors. The
negative TFP growth in the construction sector is masked by its large employment contribution.
6The data for the NACE categories only relate to data that is available and not for the whole economy.9
The electrical equipment sector shows the largest TFP growth, with the fastest growth in the US.
This reﬂects the increased manufacturing of computers and telecommunications equipment. TFP
growth in the chemicals and post and telecoms sectors are larger in the EU than the US. Overall,
the results imply that employment has been the largest contributor to output growth during this
time period while productivity growth has had a smaller but signiﬁcant contribution. The US leads
in terms of productivity growth especially in ICT production. Van Ark et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the
US has faster productivity growth in sectors that make intensive use of ICT.
Given the apparent change in the relative growth rates of TFP in both regions, as suggested,
for instance, by Figure 2, in Table 2, we also present an average of the different TFP growth rates
for the sub-period 1995 - 2005. The mid 1990s appears to be the period when US growth rates
began to increase relative to those in Europe. A comparison of the averages for the entire sample
compared to the sub-period highlight this point at the sectoral level. The relative improvement
in the US performance can be witnessed in a number of sectors such as the machinery, electrical
equipment, manufacturing, repair of motor vehicles and the retail trade.
5. Regression Speciﬁcations
Inthissectionweoutlinetheempiricalmodelsbasedonthediscussioninsection3. Theregression
speciﬁcations are discussed in discrete time as that is the format of the data. In the initial model,
we examine the pure learning effect on TFP growth in Euro area economy as described in equation
(1). This is done by using the technology gap between the Euro area and the United States:
∆logTFPea
it = λ(GAPit−1) + ǫit (18)
where the gap is deﬁned as the difference between TFP in the different sectors of the Euro area’s




The portion of the gap that is closed each year is measured by the parameter λ. Therefore the
convergence of the Euro area is due to its ability to absorb and implement new technology and
knowledge from the US. The gap can be lagged because the following country can only acquire
technology from the previous periods. We estimate (18) with OLS.
Given the inevitable heterogeneity across the different sectors of the economy, we modify the
initial speciﬁcation to include sector-speciﬁc dummies. These are included in the following panel10
data ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation:
∆logTFPea
it = λ(GAPit−1) +
26 X
i=1
βi (DUMMYi) + ǫit (20)
The dummies quantify the growth rates of TFP in each of the sectors of the Euro area economy
in the absence of any convergence to US TFP levels.
Table 3 reports results from estimation of equation (18) over the period 1981 - 2005. The
results conform with a priori expectations based on the theoretical model outlined in section 3.
The OLS estimate in (18) suggests that 2.8 per cent of the gap is closed each year. The result is
highly signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent signiﬁcance level. This suggests that the speed of convergence
of the Euro Area to US TFP levels is approximately 3 per cent per annum. The inclusion of
sector-specifc dummies of the economy results in convergence speeds which are approximately
half those of the OLS estimates - 1.2 per cent in (20). Again these results are highly signiﬁcant.
The p-values for the inclusion of the sector-speciﬁc dummies implies that heterogeneity across
sectors is signiﬁcant. For robustness sake, we also estimate a random effects version of (18). The
results are also in Table 4 and the similarity of the ﬁxed effects and random effects estimates is
reassuring. Overall, it would appear that convergence between Euro area and US TFP levels is in
the region of 1.5 per cent per annum.
5.1. Role of ICT Technology in Convergence
From Figure 2, it is evident that, in aggregate terms, over the past 10 years, US TFP growth rates
have increased quite consistently relative to those in Europe. One of the main reasons given for US
TFP growth during this period has been greater use of Information Communications Technologies
(ICT). Studies by Oliner and Sichel (2000) and (2002), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson,
Ho and Stiroh (2005) all cite the greater adoption of ICT technologies as being a major contribut-
ing factor to US TFP growth over the period. Greater use of ICT contributed to greater growth in
the US economy through greater levels of ICT investment, strong productivity effects from ICT
using industries and a more productive use of ICT, generally, throughout the economy.
Disparities in the rate of ICT adoption are increasingly cited as one of the main reasons for the
differences in productivity growth between the Euro area and the US. Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh
(2008) suggest that more ﬂexible labour markets and advanced innovation in the United States
resulted in higher productivity growth in the US compared to the Euro area. Inklaar, Timmer and
van Ark (2006) ﬁnd that ICT had a signiﬁcant impact on growth in the US economy through an
increase in ICT investment, strong productivity contributions from ICT-producing industries and11
more productive use of ICT in the rest of the economy. van Ark and Inklaar (2005) ﬁnd that the
EU is not realising the same productivity gains from ICT as the US. This result may be related to
more productive use of ICT in the US, particularly in the market services sector.
Given our modelling framework, we address the role played by ICT in a European context by
examining, explicitly, whether the greater use of ICT technologies in the Euro area can, indeed,
increase European growth rates of TFP.
In Table 4 we summarise the contribution of ICT capital services to output growth between
1980 and 2005 for the Euro area. The sectors making the largest contributions to growth include
those sectors speciﬁcally associated with ICT adoption. These include Pulp (15.3 per cent), Elec-
trical equipment (16.2 per cent), Chemicals (7.3 per cent), Post and telecommunications (66.9 per
cent) and Financial Intermediation (59 per cent). Transport and Renting also had a very signiﬁcant
effect on growth.
ToassesstheimpactofICTtechnologyonTFPgrowthweusethevariableGOConKIT from
the KLEMS database. We label the variable “ICT”. The variable measures the contribution of
ICT capital services to output growth7. We allow the ICT variable to operate through two different
channels - a direct and indirect channel. In the direct case, greater use of ICT simply increases
the growth rate of TFP, whereas in the second, indirect, channel, increased use of ICT, operates
through the gap by increasing the convergence towards US TFP levels, thereby, also increasing
Euro area TFP levels. Starting with the direct effect, we amend (20) accordingly
∆logTFPea
it = λ(GAPit−1) + β1 (ICTit) +
27 X
i=2
βi (DUMMYi) + ǫit (21)
The second regression now incorporates the indirect effect of ICT through the gap along with
the direct effect. The effect on the gap is measured by interacting the gap with the ICT variable in
the case of each industry sector.
∆logTFPea
it = α(GAPit−1) + β1 (ICTit) + β2 (ICTit ∗ GAPi,t−1) +
29 X
i=3
βi (DUMMYi) + ǫit (22)
In this case, the rate of convergence is now given by (α + β2 ∗ ICTit). So sector-speciﬁc λis can
be estimated, which are a function of the gap and the rate of ICT adoption in each sector.
7In percentage terms.12
In Table 5 we present the results from incorporating the impact of ICT adoption. The inclusion
of the ICT variable is very signiﬁcant and positive, indicating that the direct effect of greater
adoption of ICT has a positive inﬂuence on Euro area TFP growth. In the presence of solely the
direct effect, the rate of convergence remains positive and signiﬁcant at 1.5 per cent. The results
of equation (22) can be found in the second column of Table 5. In this case both the direct and
indirect effect are estimated. As can be seen from the Table, the coefﬁcient on the ICT variable
remains positive and signiﬁcant. There are now separate rates of convergence for each sector of
the economy - the rate of convergence in each sector ranges from a high of approximately 2.6
per cent per annum in the agricultural sector to a low of 1.2 per cent per annum in the case of
manufacturing.
It is interesting to contrast this positive and signiﬁcant role observed for ICT adoption and
European TFP growth rates with similiar type studies by van Ark and Inklaar (2005) and Stiroh
(2002). Both report negative8 estimates of ICT on TFP growth. The main difference, of course,
between our model and these earlier approaches, is the explicit assumption of the United States as
a growth leader in relation to the Euro area.
5.2. Structural Change
The whole-economy trends in TFP growth rates evident in Figure 2 suggest that, over the sample
period 1980 - 2005, a change took place in the respective performances of the Euro area and
US economies. It would appear that Euro area TFP rates were signiﬁcantly larger than US rates
throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s. However, from the late 1990s onwards, the United
States has experienced consistently higher growth rates. We investigate the implications of these
changes in the context of our modelling framework by examining for structural changes in the
model over the sample period. To do this we follow Baltagi and Grifﬁn (2006) and Bai and Perron
(1998) and re-specify (20) to include the additional dummy variables Dt−T, which allow for the
possibility of multiple structural breaks
∆logTFPea









Dt−T + ǫit (23)
These dummies span the period t when the break is ﬁrst hypothesised to occur until T, the
end of the sample. Fourteen structural breaks from 1990 - T until 2004 - T are allowed for. This
results in 14 additional variables. We test down and include only structural breaks, which are
8but insigniﬁcant13
signiﬁcant, in our ﬁnal estimation. This results in just one signiﬁcant dummy for the period 2001
- 2005. The results are in Table 6.9 From the table, it can be seen that the θ coefﬁcient is negative,
thereby, suggesting a signiﬁcant decline in the growth rate of Euro area TFP over the period 2001
- 2005.
What implications does this have for our convergence λ estimate? One simple way to address
this is to conduct a series of recursive estimates - we start by estimating the original model (20)
over the period 1980 - 1992 and continue to add a year until the end of the sample. This gives
an indication of how the λ estimate varies through time. The plot of the coefﬁcients is in Figure
3. The rate of convergence appears to have reached a maximum in the mid 1990s and, thereafter,
declined to its present rate of approximately 1.5 per cent. This suggests that one reason for such
strong growth in Euro area TFP over the period 1980 - 1995 was the ability of the Euro area
economy to absorb and adapt new technologies from the United States. However, since this
period, this learning capacity has declined somewhat with obvious implications for Euro area
growth.
6. Conclusion
The relationship between key economic indicators of the United States and the Euro area is an
area of continuing interest. Many studies have examined the relative performance of these key
economic regions, however, few studies have modelled an explicit long-run relationship between
both areas.
In our modelling framework, we assume that the United States acts as a growth leader for the
Euro area. We examine this through a TFP channel and assume that the greater the difference in
levels between TFP in the United States and Europe, the greater the growth rate of European TFP.
We also incorporate the impact of greater ICT adoption in this process. Our model estimates yield
plausible and signiﬁcant results suggesting, indeed, the transmission of total factor productivity
spillovers from the United States to the Euro area and, also, the importance of this channel in
inﬂuencing European growth. We also examine for, and detect, the presence of structural breaks
in European TFP rates during the sample period.
Recent studies, such as McQuinn and Whelan (2008), have outlined a relative gloomy outlook
for future European economic performance, suggesting, in particular, the potential for a further
worsening of the Euro area’s productivity performance. This is because recent growth has relied
heavily on increases in capital and labour inputs, with very little improvement in Total Factor
Productivity. Therefore, the results of this study highlight the need for Euro area policy-makers to
9Full regression results are available, upon request, from the authors.14
focus their energies on policies likely to improve the ability of the Euro area to absorb and learn
from technologies advanced in the United States. Policies, which improve the ﬂexibility of the
European economy and enable it to adapt in this fashion will be a crucial elemant in re-stimulating
future European growth.15
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22, No. 1 pp 25 - 44.Table 1: Percentage Contribution of Euro Area and US NACE Sectors to Overall Employment
and Gross Output: Sample Averages 1980 - 2005
NACE Euro Area US
Category Code Output Employment Output Employment
Agriculture A 2.9 3.6 3.2 2.5
Mining B 1.1 0.7 2.5 0.9
Food and Beverages C 5.2 3.8 4.6 2.2
Textiles D 3.0 3.6 1.6 2.2
Wood E 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9
Pulp F 2.6 2.6 3.2 2.7
Petroleum G 1.3 0.2 2.2 0.2
Chemicals H 4.1 2.1 3.4 1.3
Rubber I 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.1
Non-Metallic material J 1.5 1.6 0.8 0.7
Basic Metals K 5.5 5.0 3.6 2.7
Machinery L 3.8 4.0 2.5 2.2
Electrical equipment M 3.7 3.9 4.8 3.7
Transport equipment N 4.4 3.3 4.5 2.3
Manufacturing O 1.5 1.8 1.0 1.1
Electricity P 3.4 1.4 3.3 1.1
Construction Q 9.2 10.7 7.6 7.0
Repair of Motor Vehicles R 2.0 2.9 1.6 2.6
Wholesale trade S 4.3 6.2 6.0 7.9
Retail trade T 4.3 9.8 4.8 15.9
Hotels U 2.6 4.6 3.1 10.5
Transport V 6.5 6.4 4.3 4.6
Post and Telecoms W 2.3 2.7 2.8 1.8
Financial Intermediation X 5.9 4.7 7.4 6.9
Real Estate Y 8.1 1.0 9.4 1.7
Renting Z 8.6 11.0 9.5 13.1Table 2: Summary of Average Annual Sectoral TFP Growth Rates
NACE 1980 - 2005 1995 - 2005
Category Code Euro Area US Euro Area US
Agriculture A 2.0 2.0 1.1 1.0
Mining B -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 -1.2
Food and Beverages C 0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.6
Textiles D 0.4 0.9 -0.1 1.6
Wood E 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.3
Pulp F 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7
Petroleum G 0.3 0.2 0.5 -2.1
Chemicals H 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.2
Rubber I 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.2
Non-Metallic material J 0.6 1.0 0.3 1.1
Basic Metals K 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.9
Machinery L 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.5
Electrical equipment M 1.3 4.5 1.2 6.0
Transport equipment N 0.5 0.6 0.5 1.3
Manufacturing O 0.0 0.9 0.3 1.7
Electricity P 0.7 -0.4 1.3 0.8
Construction Q 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.0
Repair of Motor Vehicles R 0.3 1.3 -0.3 2.2
Wholesale trade S 0.5 1.0 0.7 0.2
Retail trade T 0.8 1.2 0.2 2.3
Hotels U -0.6 -0.4 -0.6 0.1
Transport V 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.3
Post and Telecoms W 2.1 0.6 2.9 1.4
Financial Intermediation X 0.2 0.7 0.2 1.0
Real Estate Y 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.6






P-Value of Fixed Effects (0.000)
Random Effects 0.015
(0.006)
Note: N = 650, the sample covers 26 sectors of the Euro area and US economies over the 25 year period
1981-2005. Standard errors are in parenthesis.Table 4: Summary of Euro Area ICT Capital Services to Output Growth Annual Average 1980 -
2005
NACE
Category Code Mean Standard Deviation
Agriculture A 0.6 0.7
Mining B 6.6 4.4
Food and Beverages C 4.3 1.5
Textiles D 4.5 3.4
Wood E 3.5 2.9
Pulp F 15.3 8.3
Petroleum G 2.5 4.4
Chemicals H 7.3 4.3
Rubber I 7.1 3.6
Non-Metallic material J 6.3 2.8
Basic Metals K 4.8 2.9
Machinery L 7.5 4.5
Electrical equipment M 16.2 12.2
Transport equipment N 6.3 3.0
Manufacturing O 5.6 3.4
Electricity P 10.8 6.6
Construction Q 4.5 1.7
Repair of Motor Vehicles R 13.0 5.2
Wholesale trade S 25.8 10.6
Retail trade T 5.3 5.2
Hotels U 2.4 2.5
Transport V 16.7 7.4
Post and Telecoms W 66.9 29.2
Financial Intermediation X 59.0 18.0
Real Estate Y 5.0 2.4
Renting Z 54.9 22.6Table 5: ICT Model Convergence Estimates (λ)










λa 0.026 λn 0.015
λb 0.016 λo 0.017
λc 0.018 λp 0.018
λd 0.012 λq 0.017
λe 0.020 λr 0.018
λf 0.018 λs 0.018
λg 0.017 λt 0.023
λh 0.016 λu 0.021
λi 0.017 λv 0.018
λj 0.018 λw 0.015
λk 0.018 λx 0.016
λl 0.016 λy 0.016
λm 0.014 λz 0.017
Note: N = 650, the sample covers 26 sectors of the Euro area and US economies over the 25 year period






Note: N = 650, the sample covers 26 sectors of the Euro area and US economies over the 25 year period
1981-2005. Standard errors are in parenthesis.Figure 1: Euro Area and US Labour Productivity Growth
Three-Year Averages, Annual Rate
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USFigure 3: Plot of Convergence Estimate
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